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The Gonzalez case is the latest in a growing series of cases that chip away at the Rule of
Non-Contradiction. The case, for all practical purposes, entailed a trial on the merits before the
extradition magistrate. This Article takes issue with Gonzalez and other cases that erode the Rule
of Non-Contradiction. Recognizing the fairness concerns that motivate deviation from the Rule,
this Article proposes a modification to it. Specifically, this Article proposes that courts adopt an
approach similar to that used in civil cases for deciding a motion for summary judgment. If the
accused’s evidence is such that no reasonable fact finder could disagree with it, then the court
should admit it, even if it provides a defense to the charges or contradicts evidence presented by
the requesting government.
THE RULE OF NON-CONTRADICTION IN
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
PROCEEDINGS: A PROPOSED




On the morning ofJune 30, 1998, three armed men robbed
a bank in Puebla, Mexico, taking cash and travelers checks. Six
months later, two brothers-in-law, Gonzalez and Huerta, were ar-
rested in Louisiana while attempting to cash one of the stolen
travelers checks. Gonzalez and Huerta professed their inno-
cence. Gonzalez claimed he had received the travelers checks
from a man in Mexico in exchange for Mexican pesos. The Gov-
ernment of Mexico demanded Gonzalez' and Huerta's extradi-
tion. The U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Louisiana
commenced an extradition proceeding against them in U.S. Dis-
trict Court.1
Gonzalez and Huerta made an application to be released on
bail, which in extradition cases is only available in "special cir-
cumstances."2 The two suspects argued that special circum-
stances existed because the government would most likely fail to
establish probable cause that they had committed the crimes
charged, a sine qua non for certifying them for extradition. The
extradition magistrate4 conducted an evidentiary hearing on the
bail application.
The government's evidence at the bail hearing consisted of
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1. See In re Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725 (W.D. La. 1999).
2. See id. at 735 (citing Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S. Ct. 781, 47 L. Ed. 948
(1903)).
3. Id. at 736.
4. The judicial officer who presides over an extradition hearing is called an "extra-
dition magistrate," even if he or she is a U.S. District Court judge.
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an affidavit stating that three Mexican eyewitnesses (two police
officers and a bank employee) had identified the suspects from
single photographs faxed to Mexico by Louisiana police. As the
photographs were being shown to the witnesses, the witnesses
were informed that these men had been arrested while trying to
cash the travelers checks that had been stolen during the bank
robbery.- The extradition magistrate found the government's
evidence to be "highly suspect," improperly "suggestive," and
"unreliable."6 The extradition magistrate then permitted the
suspects to present an alibi defense at the bail hearing. Gonza-
lez and Huerta each testified, and called alibi witnesses as well.
The court found the accused and their alibi witnesses credible.7
The court granted bail.8
Were this a domestic criminal case, these events would not
have been the least bit noteworthy. But In re Gonzalez9 was not a
domestic criminal case. It was part of an international extradi-
tion proceeding.
The Gonzalez case, in which the accused was permitted to
present a defense of alibi, albeit in the context of a bail hearing,
represents a radical departure from traditional extradition juris-
prudence. International extradition proceedings in the U.S.
courts are governed by the evidentiary rule that the accused has
no right to present a defense to the charges against him,"° such
as an alibi defense," and has "no right to introduce evidence
which merely contradicts the demanding country's proof, or
which only poses conflicts of credibility."12 Moreover, under
5. Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 733-35, 737.
6. Id. at 737.
7. See id. at 741 (finding that accused "presented credible and persuasive evidence
that they were elsewhere on the date of the robbery and could not have perpetrated this
crime").
8. Id.
9. In re Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725 (W.D. La. 1999).
10. Such as the defense of innocence, see Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300, 302
(2d Cir. 1981); duress, see In re Powell, 4 F. Supp. 2d 945, 958-59 (S.D. Cal. 1998);
insanity, see, e.g., Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 457 (1913); orjustification, see, e.g., In
re Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 986 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1894). The accused may, however, present a
defense expressly permitted by the applicable extradition treaty, such as, for example, a
defense that the crime charged is a non-extraditable political offense. See, e.g., Eain v.
Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
11. See, e.g., Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1369 (9th Cir. 1978); Eain, 641 F.2d at
512; Desmond v. Eggers, 18 F.2d 503, 505 (9th Cir. 1927); In re Okeke, No. 96-7019P-01,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22379, at *13 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 1996).
12. In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Eain, 641 F.2d at
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traditional application of the rule, evidence that the requesting
government's witnesses later recanted their incriminating state-
ments is not admissible in the extradition proceeding. 3 This Ar-
ticle refers to this rule as the "Rule of Non-Contradiction" (or
"Rule"). While U.S. courts have generally adhered to the Rule of
Non-Contradiction, Gonzalez can be viewed as the latest in a
growing line of cases that erode the Rule.
The Rule of Non-Contradiction permits the accused to in-
troduce evidence of very limited scope. The accused may only
introduce evidence that "explains" the government's evidence,
i.e., that provides an innocent explanation for events that the
government contends point toward guilt. In particular, to the
extent that the government relies upon circumstantial evidence,
the accused is generally permitted to introduce evidence that
helps to explain it away.' 4
The Rule of Non-Contradiction has been described as
512; United States ex reL Petrushansky v. Marasco, 325 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 556 (5th Cir.
1962); Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 690 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Messina v. United
States, 728 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1984).
13. See Eain, 641 F.2d at 512 (refusing to admit evidence that accusing witnesses
later recanted their accusations); Bovio v. United States, 989 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir.
1993) (holding that recantation by accusing witness excluded since accused "has no
right to attack the credibility of [accusing witness] at this stage of the proceedings;
issues of credibility are to be determined at trial.").
14. See United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 118 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating
that accused permitted to "present an explanation for the loans and payments" alleged
by the government to have been bribes);Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 362 F. Supp. 1057, 1064-
65 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (allowing accused charged with embezzlement to offer evidence "to
explain the deposit of moneys in [his] account"); In re D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925, 929-
30 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (kidnapping case, where victim was held in shack on property
owned by accused, accused allowed to explain that shack was in remote area of large
property, and was rarely visited by accused); Na-Yuet, 690 F. Supp. at 1011 (kidnapping
case, accused entitled to offer evidence that would "explain [her] relationship with al-
leged accomplices and thereby account for her involvement with the ransom money,"
and evidence that would "explain [her] alleged 'flight' from" requesting country). See
also Order of United States Commissioner Richard S. Goldsmith dated Nov. 30, 1966,
M.S. Department of State, file PS 10-4 CAN-US, reprinted in 6 MARJORIE M. WHIMAN,
DIGSr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1008-10 (1968) (listing unreported case in which extra-
dition magistrate concluded that accused "has satisfactorily explained" government's
proof and thereby defeated showing of probable cause). But cf. Sindona, 450 F. Supp. at
690 (stating bank fraud case, issue of what caused bank's failure was "a matter of cir-
cumstantial evidence," but given "substantial bodies of evidence" that would have to be
explored to reach conclusion on issue, extradition magistrate excluded evidence prof-
fered by accused as "not truly 'explanatory' within the meaning of the authorities.").
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"somewhat murky."' 5 Courts applying the Rule have not drawn a
clear distinction between evidence that "explains" the govern-
ment's proof and evidence that "contradicts" it.' 6 Indeed, courts
admit that the distinction is "difficult to articulate."' 7
The Rule of Non-Contradiction stems from the premise that
an extradition hearing is not a trial on the merits.'" Rather, it is
a probable cause hearing, wherein disputed issues of fact are not
resolved by the extradition magistrate. Instead, issues of fact are
left for trial in the requesting country. 19
Courts that give the Rule a strict interpretation hold that if
the requesting government's case includes the testimony of an
accomplice or other percipient witness, then that person's testi-
mony must be deemed true for purposes of the extradition pro-
15. Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Peryea v. United
States, 782 F. Supp. 937, 940 (D. Vt. 1991); In re Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725, 740
(W.D. La. 1999).
16. See, e.g., Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 175 (Ist Cir. 1991) (noting that "the
line between 'contradictory' and 'explanatory' evidence is not sharply drawn"); In re
Schweidenback, 3 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117 (D. Mass. 1998) (same);Jhirad, 362 F. Supp. at
1064 ("[t]he law is somewhat unclear as to what evidence a fugitive can advance at the
hearing .... The line between an explanation and a contradiction is a narrow and
sometimes invisible one."); Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. 777, 782
(N.D. Cal. 1985) ("[c]ourts have struggled to clarify the distinction"); In re Singh, 124
F.R.D. 571, 573 (D.NJ. 1987).
17. See, e.g., Sindona, 450 F. Supp. at 685 ("The distinction between 'contradictory
evidence' and 'explanatory evidence' is difficult to articulate."); Gill, 747 F. Supp. at
1044; In re Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1463, 1464 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
18. See, e.g., Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316, 42 S. Ct. 469, 66 L. Ed. 464 (1922);
Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447,461, 33 S. Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274 (1913); In re Orteiza y
Cortes, 136 U.S. 330, 337, 10 S. Ct. 1031, 34 L. Ed. 464 (1890); In re Wadge, 15 F. 864,
886 (1883); In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 685, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Jhirad, 362 F.
Supp. at 1060; Gill, 747 F. Supp. at 1044.
19. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that
evidence that would merely create "a conflict of credibility" was properly excluded;
"such a contest" of credibility "should properly await trial in Israel"); In re Sandhu, No.
90 Cr. Misc. No. 1 (JCF), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7314, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1997)
("[piroof that [accused] have been victims of fabricated evidence in other cases cer-
tainly casts doubt on the truthfulness of witnesses proffered by the Indian government.
But that ultimate credibility determination must be made by the finder of fact at trial in
the requesting country."); Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
("[p]etitioner will have a full opportunity to challenge the credibility of his alleged
accomplices' confessions at a trial in Israel under the rules of evidence in that country
.. "); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 511 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[s]uch a contest should be
resolved at trial in Israel."); Sindona v. Grant, 461 F. Supp. 199, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
("[t]he accused has no right.., to present evidence which.., poses a question of
credibility.").
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ceeding.2 ° Other courts are less deferential; while prohibiting
the accused from introducing evidence to contradict the govern-
ment's proof, these courts subject the government's evidence to
careful scrutiny and even skepticism.2 ' Prior to the 1999 Gonza-
lez decision, no published U.S. court opinion had allowed alibi
evidence in an international extradition proceeding.
22
Applied strictly, as it often is, the Rule of Non-Contradiction
leads to harsh results. Under the Rule, the credibility of even
the most disreputable government witness may not be im-
peached, and the testimony of even the most reputable defense
20. See In re Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032, 1050-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[t]he primary
source of evidence for the probable cause determination is the extradition request, and
any evidence submitted in it is deemed truthful for purposes of this determination."
later proceeding Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 399-400.); In re Pineda Lara, No. 97 Cr. Misc. 1
(THK), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1777, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1998) ("[iun determining
whether probable cause exists, the Court assumes that the evidence contained in the
Request for Extradition is true."); Singh, 124 F.R.D. at 572 ("[d]efendants may not at-
tack an affiant's credibility in this extradition proceeding"); In re Marzook, 924 F. Supp.
565, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("I must accept as true all of the statements and offers of proof
by the demanding state."); In re Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 795 n.6 (D. Conn. 1997)
(same).
21. See, e.g., Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that
extradition magistrate has some latitude in assessing credibility and is not strictly bound
by face of government's affidavits); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 815 (9th Cir.
1986) ("[t]he credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony is
solely within the province of the extradition magistrate."); Argento v. Jacobs, 176 F.
Supp. 877, 883 (N.D. Ohio 1959) ("the Court must scrutinize the evidence carefully to
determine at least a reasonable probability that the petitioner was guilty of the crime.");
Austin v. Healy, 5 F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 1993); In re D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925, 930
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 690 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Esco-
bedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1102 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980); Moghadam, 617 F.
Supp. at 782-84; Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252, 1265 (N.D. Ga. 1977);
Shapiro, 355 F. Supp. at 572.
22. The Gonzalez court cited two extradition cases in which it said "alibi evidence
was presented and considered." In re Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725, 739 (W.D. La.
1999). In one such case, United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 1984), the
Eighth Circuit, upholding extradition, stated that the extradition magistrate was "quite
generous in permitting Wiebe to address the charges against him," but did not set forth
the manner in which the accused had done so, except to say that the accused
'presented no evidence, other than his own testimony..." W'ebe, 733 F.2d at 553. No
alibi evidence is mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion. The other case cited by
the Gonzalez court, Correll v. Stewart, No. 91-1009, 1991 WL 157246 (6th Cir. Aug. 16,
1991), is an unpublished opinion. Upholding extradition to Denmark, the Sixth Cir-
cuit summarized the evidence that established probable cause, which included the ac-
cused's "false exculpatory statements, [and] statements made by [the accused's] alibi
witness which were later retracted..." Correll, No. 91-1009, 1991 WL 157246. While the
opinion provides no more information than this about the "alibi witness," a fair reading
is that it was the government that introduced the fact that an alibi witness had initially
come forward to exculpate the accused, but had then retracted the alibi.
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witness may not be introduced to contradict the government's
evidence. Thus, the Rule severely limits the ability of the ac-
cused to challenge the government's evidence in support of
probable cause.
It is not difficult to see why a U.S. court might be troubled
by the Rule of Non-Contradiction, particularly when the accused
has compelling evidence that contradicts the government's
proof. The extradition magistrate is charged with protecting the
accused's due process rights, and the extradition hearing is the
primary vehicle through which the accused is accorded due pro-
cess.21 When an extradition magistrate is forced to exclude com-
pelling exculpatory evidence proffered by the accused, the Rule
of Non-Contradiction creates the risk of a hearing that is funda-
mentally unfair.
Moreover, certain evidence is, on its face, so dispositive that,
in civil litigation, a court would be bound by it as a matter of
law.24 Surely if there were documentary, photographic, or other
unimpeachable evidence that completely refuted the requesting
government's proof, it might be difficult for a U.S. extradition
magistrate to disregard it entirely. At the same time, courts are
emphatic that an extradition hearing is not a trial.25 Allowing
23. United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir. 1997)
("[e]xtradition proceedings before United States courts [must] comport with the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution"); Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 686 (5th Cir. 1969)
("[t]he Due Process clause guarantees [the accused] the right to a hearing prior to
extradition."); Peroff v. Hylton, 563 F.2d 1099, 1103 (4th Cir. 1977) (finding that ac-
cused received due process at extradition hearing and habeas corpus proceedings);
United States v. Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[this court recognizes that
serious due process concerns may merit review beyond the narrow scope of inquiry in
extradition proceedings.").
24. See, e.g., Colip v. Clare, 26 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 1994); Archie v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 813 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Miss. 1992); Jackson v. Riley Stoker Corp., 57
F.RD. 120, 121 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
25. See supra note 18; see also Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911). The
court stated that
[i] t is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all of the factit-
itous niceties of a criminal trial at common law. But it is a waste of time ....
[I]f there is presented.., such reasonable ground to suppose him guilty as to
make it proper that he should be tried, good faith to the demanding govern-
ment requires his surrender.
Glucksman, 221 U.S. at 512; Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 517, 36 S. Ct. 634, 60 L.
Ed. 1136 (1916); Webe, 733 F.2d at 553; Zanazanian v. United States, 729 F.2d 624, 627
(9th Cir. 1984); Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999); Eain v. Wilkes,
641 F.2d 504, 511 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Jimenez v. Aris-
teguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 556 (5th Cir. 1962).
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the accused to introduce contradictory evidence risks transform-
ing the extradition hearing into a trial on the merits, a notion
fundamentally at odds with extradition jurisprudence in the
United States and elsewhere, 26 and in derogation of the terms of
U.S. extradition treaties 7.2  Thus, there is a tension between the
need to avoid a trial on the merits, and the risk that an accused
will be deprived of a fair hearing by the exclusion of exculpatory
evidence.
The Gonzalez case is the latest in a growing series of cases
that chip away at the Rule of Non-Contradiction. The case, for
all practical purposes, entailed a trial on the merits before the
extradition magistrate.28 This Article takes issue with Gonzalez
and other cases29 that erode the Rule of Non-Contradiction.
Recognizing the fairness concerns that motivate deviation from
the Rule, this Article proposes a modification to it. Specifically,
this Article proposes that courts adopt an approach similar to
26. See WHITFmAN, supra note 14, at 998-1004 (citing statutes and case law follow-
ing Rule of Non-Contradiction).
27. See, e.g., Bingham, 241 U.S. at 517. The Court held that
[i] t is one of the objects of [the extradition statute] to obviate the necessity of
confronting the accused with the witnesses against him; and a construction of
this section, or of the treaty, that would require the demanding government to
send its citizens to another country to institute legal proceedings would defeat
the whole object of the treaty.
Id. (emphasis added); Shapiro, 478 F.2d at 902 (quoting Bingham); In re Farez, 8 F. Cas.
1007, 1012 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870) ("[s]uch a result would entirely destroy the object of
such treaties."); In re Wadge, 15 F. 864, 866 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 16 Fed. Rep. 332
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883)
[t]he result would be that the foreign government, though entitled by the
terms of the treaty to the extradition of the accused for the purpose of a trial
where the crime was committed, would be compelled to go into a full trial on
the merits in a foreign country .... This would be in plain contravention of the
intent and meaning of the extradition treaties ...
Wadge, 15 F. at 866 (emphasis added); In re Orteiza y Cortes, 136 U.S. 330, 337, 36 S. Ct.
634, 60 L. Ed. 1136 (1890) (citing Wadge).
28. At the bail hearing in Gonzalez, the accused called, inter alia, the following wit-
nesses: Gonzalez (an accused), whom the court expressly found to be "a credible wit-
ness"; Huerta (an accused), who testified he had not left the United States since 1989;
Huerta's sister, who testified that she was 75% certain that Huerta was babysitting her
children on the evening of the date in question; Huerta's employer, who testified he
was certain that Huerta was at work on the date in question, and who the court ex-
pressly found to be "a credible witness"; and two character witnesses, including Huerta's
priest, who testified he is "certain that Huerta is incapable of robbing a bank." In re
Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725, 730-32 (W.D. La. 1999). The government objected to the
testimony as violative of the Rule of Non-Contradiction, but, for the most part, elected
not to cross-examine these witnesses. Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 729 n.4.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 70-195.
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that used in civil cases for deciding a motion for summary judg-
ment. If the accused's evidence is such that no reasonable fact
finder could disagree with it, then the court should admit it, even
if it provides a defense to the charges or contradicts evidence
presented by the requesting government. Such evidence would
refute probable cause without requiring what is in essence a trial
before the extradition magistrate. 0 On the other hand, if the
accused's evidence is such that reasonable fact finders could dis-
agree with it, then the Rule of Non-Contradiction should gov-
ern, and the extradition magistrate should leave the disputed is-
sue for trial in the requesting country.
I. TE EXTRADITION HEARING
Extradition proceedings in the United States are governed
by the applicable extradition treaty, statutes,3' and case law. To
secure an accused's extradition, the government must show, inter
alia, that the accused has been charged by the requesting gov-
ernment with one or more crimes that fall within the scope of
the applicable extradition treaty, and that there is probable
cause to believe that the accused committed the crimes
charged.32 The extradition magistrate conducts a hearing to de-
termine whether the government has established each of the ele-
ments needed for extradition, which includes a showing of prob-
able cause. The probable cause hearing is comparable to a pre-
liminary hearing in a domestic criminal case.33
30. Cf Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (allowing defense
to introduce evidence that court in requesting country found co-conspirator's confes-
sion untrue and coerced; admission of evidence "comports with the purpose of the
limiting distinction between explanatory and contradictory evidence because it requires
the taking of no testimony requiring the extradition magistrate to weigh and choose
between contradictory stories.").
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1999).
32. See, e.g., Peroffv. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976); M. CHERIF BAS-
SIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADInION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACrCE 703, 711-13
(1996). For a summary of extradition procedure in the United States, see generally,
Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquity in Interna-
tional Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1198, 1201-03 (1991).
33. See, e.g., Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463, 8 S. Ct. 1240, 32 L. Ed. 234
(1888). The Court explained that
of the character of those preliminary examinations which take place every day
in this country before an examining or committing magistrate for the purpose
of determining whether a case is made out which willjustify the holding of the
accused.., to ultimately answer to an indictment, or other proceeding, in
which he shall be finally tried upon the charge made against him.
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The applicable statute3 4 requires the extradition magistrate
to determine whether the evidence is "sufficient to sustain the
charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or conven-
tion."- Thus, by its terms, the statute adopts, as the probable
cause standard in a given case, whatever standard is set forth in
the pertinent extradition treaty. Frequently, although not uni-
versally,-" U.S. extradition treaties provide that extradition may
only occur upon such evidence of criminality as would be suffi-
cient to hold the accused for trial according to the laws of the
place where the accused is found. 7 Courts apply the federal
standard for probable cause:' "evidence sufficient to cause a
person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously en-
tertain a reasonable belief of the accused's guilt."
3 9
II. THE RULE OF NON-CONTRADICTION
A. Definition and Application of the Rule
The following is a frequently-cited formulation of the Rule
of Non-Contradiction:
Id.; accord Austin v. Healey, 5 F.3d 598, 603 (2d Cir. 1993); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d
167, 175 (2d. Cir. 1980); Peroff, 563 F.2d at 1102; United States v. Taitz, 134 F.R.D. 288,
289 (S.D. Cal. 1991).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1999).
35. Id.
36. Cf Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Swiss Confederation
and the Government of the United States of America, Nov. 14, 1990, entered into force
Sept. 10, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-9, Art. 9, § 3(b) (explaining that evidence in
support of extradition request must include "a summary of the facts of the case, of the
relevant evidence, and of the conclusions reached, providing a reasonable basis to be-
lieve that the person sought committed the offense for which extradition is requested").
37. See BAsslouN, supra note 32, at 706 ("This is the traditional standard of prob-
able cause which is embodied in most treaties.").
38. I& at 712; Sindona, 619 F.2d at 175; Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F.
Supp. 777, 782 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
39. Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See, e.g., United
States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting Coleman); Moghadam, 617 F.
Supp. at 782; In re Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032, 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Gonzalez, 52 F.
Stpp. 2d 725, 736 (W.D. La. 1999); BAssiourI, supra note 32, at 724. However, with
respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause, some courts have
looked to the law of the state in the which hearing is taking place. See, e.g., In re Shapiro,
352 F. Supp. 641, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("state law provides primary initial guidance in an
extradition proceeding"). Other courts have applied federal standards. See, e.g., Eain v.
Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981). See generally BAssIouNi, supra note 32, at 719,
731-35; see also Greci v. Birknes, 527 F.2d 956, 958-60 (1st Cir. 1976) (examining negoti-
ating history of U.S.-Italy extradition treaty and concluding that treaty parties wanted
federal, not state standard to apply).
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An accused person's right to produce evidence at an extradi-
tion hearing is limited. The rule is that the accused has no
right to introduce evidence which merely contradicts the de-
manding country's proof, or which only poses conflicts of
credibility. On the other hand, the accused has the right to
introduce evidence which is "explanatory" of the demanding
country's proof. The extent of such explanatory evidence to
be received is largely in the discretion of the judge ruling on
the extradition request
The distinction between "contradictory evidence" and "ex-
planatory evidence" is difficult to articulate. However, the
purpose behind the rule is reasonably clear. In admitting
"explanatory evidence," the intention is to afford an accused
person the opportunity to present reasonably clear-cut proof
which would be of limited scope and have some reasonable
chance of negating a showing of probable cause. The scope
of this evidence is restricted to what is appropriate to an ex-
tradition hearing. The decisions are emphatic that the ex-
traditee cannot be allowed to turn the extradition hearing
into a full trial on the merits.40
The precise scope of the Rule is within the extradition magis-
trate's "discretion."41
Courts applying the Rule of Non-Contradiction have gener-
ally drawn a distinction between facts and conclusions. Unlike
inferences and conclusions, facts may not be contradicted.42 In
40. In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1978 (citations omitted).
41. Id.; see also Petrushansky v. Marasco, 325 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1963); Hooker
v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1369 (9th Cir. 1978). There is some authority to the effect that
the scope of the extradition magistrate's discretion extends even to allowing the ac-
cused to introduce contradictory evidence. See Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 552-53 ("the magis-
trate was quite generous in permitting" the accused to testify and to deny "any culpabil-
ity or involvement in the crimes with which he was charged"); BAssIOUNI, supra note 32,
at 731 ("[T]he right of courts to bar evidence which merely contradicts probable cause
or which presents a different version of events remains discretionary, though it is usu-
ally excluded."). Cf Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing
cases). See also John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J.
1441, 1469-71 (1988) (characterizing Rule of Non-Contradiction as "myth," but ac-
knowledging that "a United States court sitting for extradition will not allow a full-scale
defense to the merits of the case, because that is the function of the judicial authorities
abroad.").
42. See, e.g., United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 118 (1st Cir. 1997);
Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 362 F. Supp. 1057, 1064-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); In re D'Amico, 185 F.
Supp. 925, 929-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 690 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (S.D.
Fla. 1988). But cf. In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. at 690 (refusing to allow accused to chal-
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some cases, foreign governments have sought to take advantage
of the Rule by cloaking the conclusions of their own investigat-
ing magistrates' or other officials as "facts" that are not subject
to contradiction under the Rule.' For the most part, U.S. courts
have refused to rubber stamp conclusions of foreign investiga-
tors even when characterized as fact.45
The Rule is applied most easily at its extremes. For exam-
ple, where the government relies upon accomplice testimony to
establish probable cause,4 6 the accused may not call witnesses to
lenge conclusions of Italian investigators that accused's conduct caused banks' col-
lapse).
43. See generally, 1 JOHN M. FEDDERS, et aL, TRANsNATIONAL LITIGATION: PRACnCAL
APPROACHES TO CoNFucTs AND ACCOMMODATIONS 196-97 (1984). In European coun-
tries that utilize the inquisitorial system, investigations are conducted by investigating or
examining magistrates, who have broad powers, inter alia, to compel production of doc-
uments and testimony. Id. At the conclusion of the investigation, the investigating
magistrate issues a report that contains findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
which may include credibility determinations. Id.; see also In re Kasper-Ansermet, 123
FR.D. 622, 633-34 (D.N.J. 1990) (discussing role of investigating magistrate under Swiss
law).
44. See cases cited infra note 45.
45. See Parretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997), reh'g granted,
124 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 1997), op. withdrawn on other grounds, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 877, 119 S. Ct. 179, 142 L. Ed.2d 146 (1998) (rejecting
government's argument that French investigating magistrate "should be presumed to
be reliable and that his reliability cloaks his allegations of fact with sufficient credibility
to establish probable cause, even in the absence of any showing of a basis for crediting
whatever evidence he relied upon."); In re Extradition of Sauvage, 819 F. Supp. 896, 903
(S.D. Cal. 1993) (refusing to accept the conclusions of French investigating magistrate;
extradition treaty "requires this court to make an independent determination from evi-
dence as to probable cause"); In re Extradition of Ernst, No. 97 Crim. Misc. 1, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10523, at *2-24, 29 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998) (stating that even where de-
fendant had already been convicted in absentia in Switzerland, that conviction "must be
regarded as only a charge and the government is required to make an independent
showing of probable cause to believe that [the accused] committed the offenses with
which he is charged"; extradition magistrate's determination of probable cause "cannot
be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others"); Caltagirone v. Grant, 629
F.2d 739, 743-44 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that extradition magistrate may not defer to
foreign magistrate's determination that arrest warrant should issue for accused);
United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 1984) ("the record does not support
[the accused's] contentions that the magistrate failed to conduct an independent re-
view of the evidence and merely 'rubber stamped' the Spanish indictment."); Bobadilla
v. Reno, 826 F. Supp. 1428, 1433 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (admitting expert testimony "as to the
unreliability of the Honduran reports on the blood and fibers .... The Court is per-
suaded by Petitioner's argument that the government's evidence concerning the blood
and fibers is incompetent due to lack of generally accepted scientific procedures.").
But cf. Sindona, 450 F. Supp. at 688, 690 (giving "considerable weight" to "opinions" of
Italian bank examiners and liquidator).
46. The self-incriminating statements of accomplices can be sufficient to establish
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offer a contrary account 47 or to establish an alibi.4" The accused
may, however, offer evidence to explain the government's proof
without contradicting it.49 An example of explanatory evidence
is found in United States v. Lui Kin-Hong.0 The accused was per-
mitted to offer evidence to explain various payments that the
government alleged were bribes. The source, amount, and tim-
ing of the payments were not controverted in any respect, and,
under the Rule of Non-Contradiction, could not have been.
However, to the extent that the government was arguing that it
was reasonable to infer that the payments were in fact bribes, the
accused was allowed to introduce evidence that the payments
had an innocent explanation. 5'
B. Origin and Premises of the Rule of Non-Contradiction
The Rule of Non-Contradiction derives from the basic
premise that a probable cause hearing is not a trial on the mer-
its. 2 In re Wadge53 is an early reported case that invoked a ver-
probable cause at an extradition hearing. See, e.g., Zanazanian v. United States, 729
F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1984); Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999);
Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); In re Atta,
706 F. Supp. 1032, 1051 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). Moreover, some courts have recognized that
accomplice testimony can be "of particular importance ... where all the alleged crimi-
nal activity occurred in a distant country." Eain, 641 F.2d at 510; accord, Atta, 706 F.
Supp. at 1051.
47. See, e.g., Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252, 1266 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
("[T] he mere presentation of witnesses who testify as to an opposite version of facts will
not" affect probable cause determination; "[tlhe resolution of such conflicts in evi-
dence must await a trial on the merits."); accord, Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617
F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Cal. 1985); see also Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 355 F. Supp. 563, 572
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
48. See, e.g., Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1369 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
932 (1978); Eain, 641 F.2d at 510; In re Okeke, No. 96-7019P-01, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22379, at *13 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 1996).
49. See, e.g., Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. at 781-82 ("the accused may produce evi-
dence to explain matters, [but] the court may exclude evidence which merely contra-
dicts government testimony, poses conflicts of credibility or establishes a defense") (cit-
ing cases) (emphasis in original); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 362 F. Supp. 1057, 1064-65
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 690 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (S.D. Fla. 1988); In re
D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925, 929-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
50. United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 1997).
51. The accused's explanation was that the payments were merely gifts made by a
grateful business associate for having introduced a lucrative business relationship sev-
eral years earlier. The court, however, elected not to believe the accused's explanation,
finding it "inherently implausible." Id. at 119.
52. See supra and infra notes 18-19, 25, 40, 55, 60, 69, and accompanying text.
53. In re Wadge, 15 F. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
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sion of the Rule of Non-Contradiction. The accused was sought
for extradition by the United Kingdom on a charge of forgery.
The accused sought a stay of the extradition hearing so that he
could secure alibi evidence in the United Kingdom. The extra-
dition magistrate refused to issue the stay, and certified the ac-
cused for extradition. The district court denied the accused's pe-
tition for a writ of habeas corpus. 4 Rejecting the accused's argu-
ment that he should have been accorded a stay to obtain and
present evidence in his defense, the court wrote:
If this were recognized as the legal right of the accused in
extradition proceedings, it would give him the option of insisting
upon a full hearing and trial of his case here; and that might compel
the demanding government to produce all its evidence here, both direct
and rebutting, in order to meet the defense thus gathered from every
quarter. The result would be that the foreign government,
though entitled by the terms of the treaty to the extradition
of the accused for the purpose of a trial where the crime was
committed, would be compelled to go into a full trial on the merits
in a foreign country, under all the disadvantages of such a situation,
and could not obtain extradition until after it had procured a
conviction of the accused upon a full and substantial trial
here. This would be in plain contravention of the intent and mean-
ing of the extradition treaties, which are designed to secure a trial in
the country where the crime was committed, through the extradi-
tion of the accused, upon sufficient proof, according to our
law, to justify a commitment here.55
The Wadge holding was endorsed by the Supreme Court in
1890.56
54. An extradition magistrate's certification of extraditability is not appealable; the
accused may obtain limited review by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with
the district court, and may appeal denial of the petition to the Court of Appeals. See,
e.g., Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369, 40 S. Ct. 347, 64 L. Ed. 616 (1920); Bovio v.
United States, 989 F.2d 255, 257 n.2 (7th Cir. 1993).
55. Wadge, 15 F. at 866 (emphasis added).
56. See In re Orteiza y Cortes, 136 U.S. 330, 337, 10 S. Ct. 1031, 34 L. Ed. 464
(1890). In Orteiza, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an extradition magistrate's refusal
to allow the accused, sought for embezzlement by the Government of Cuba, to intro-
duce documentary evidence in his defense. The accused had managed to have the
documents certified by the U.S. consul general in Cuba, and sought to invoke a statute,
Sec. 5 of Act of Aug. 3, 1882, c. 378, 22 Stat. 216 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3190 (1999)), that said that any properly certified document would be received in
evidence at the extradition hearing. The Supreme Court held that the statute was in-
tended solely for the benefit of the requesting government, and could not be invoked
by the accused. The opinion revolved around the application of the statute, and did
130720001
1308 FORDHAMINTERNVATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:1295
The current formulation of the Rule of Non-Contradiction
began to take shape in Charlton v. Kelly. In Charlton, the
Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of "impressive evidence of
the insanity of the accused," 8 stating: "[t] o have witnesses pro-
duced to contradict the testimony for the prosecution is obviously
a very different thing from hearing witnesses for the purpose of
explaining matters referred to by the witnesses for the Govern-
ment."59 The Court grounded its rationale for the ruling on the
tenet that an extradition proceeding "is not a trial. The issue is
confined to the single question of whether the evidence for the
State makes a prima facie case of guilt sufficient to make it
proper to hold the party for trial ' 60
The Supreme Court further developed the Rule of Non-
Contradiction in Collins v. Loisel.61 There, the Court, citing
Wadge and Charlton, rejected the accused's argument that the ex-
tradition magistrate had improperly excluded defense evidence,
stating that "Collins was allowed to testify ... to things which
might have explained ambiguities or doubtful elements in the
prima facie case made against him. In other words, he was per-
mitted to introduce evidence bearing upon the issue of probable
cause. The evidence excluded related strictly to the defense."6 2
The Rule of Non-Contradiction has impacted U.S. interna-
tional relations. In the Insull case,63 the United States de-
manded that an individual accused of various financial crimes,
including fraud, be extradited from Greece. In the extradition
proceeding in Greece, the court received evidence introduced
not expressly state that the accused could not under any circumstance introduce evi-
dence that would contradict the requesting country's proof. The Court explicitly en-
dorsed, however, the district court's decision in Wadge. Orteiza, 136 U.S. at 337.
57. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 33 S. Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274 (1913).
58. Id. at 457.
59. Id. at 461 (emphasis added). The Court found support for this distinction in
an early circuit court case, United States v. White, 28 F. Cas. 588 (C.C.D. Pa. 1807) [No.
16, 6857]. In White, the court delineated the scope of a preliminary examination in a
domestic criminal case as follows: "the defendant's witnesses are not examined ...
[but] the judge may examine witnesses who were present at the time when the offense
is said to have been committed, to explain what is said by the witnesses for the prosecu-
tion ..." White, 28 F. Cas. at 588 (emphasis added).
60. Charlton, 229 U.S. at 461.
61. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 42 S. Ct. 469, 66 L. Ed. 956 (1922).
62. Id. at 315-16 (emphasis added).
63. Decision on the Application of the United States of America for the Extradi-
tion of Samuel Insull, Sr., Decision No. 119/1933 (Greek Court of Appeals, Oct. 31,
1933), translated and reprinted in at 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 362 (1934).
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on behalf of the accused, and concluded that the accused lacked
the intent to defraud.64 Extradition was denied.
The U.S. Department of State protested to the Greek Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, complaining that "it is evident that the
authorities attempted actually to try the case instead of confining
themselves to ascertaining whether the evidence submitted by
the U.S. Government was sufficient to justify the fugitive's appre-
hension and commitment for trial."" The U.S. Department of
State went on to say that it "considers the decision utterly unten-
able and a clear violation of the" extradition treaty between the
two countries.66 As a result of the Insull case, the United States
formally denounced its extradition treaty with Greece."
The importance of abiding by the Rule of Non-Contradic-
tion was further underscored in connection with a 1961 U.S. ex-
tradition proceeding against former dictator Marcos Perez
Jimenez of Venezuela, sought by Venezuela for various financial
and other crimes committed during his regime.6" U.S. Secretary
of State Dean Rusk responded to a request from Attorney Gen-
eral Robert F. Kennedy concerning the scope of evidence to be
allowed at the extradition hearing. The Secretary of State in-
formed the Attorney General of the Rule of Non-Contradiction,
and explained:
There are sound practical reasons for this rule. As a general
matter, the determination of whether an individual has vio-
lated the laws of a country should and can best be made by
the courts of that country and in that country where, in the
usual case, the acts alleged to be criminal were committed
and where the evidence, for both the prosecution and the
defense, is most readily available. To accomplish this, this
country has entered into extradition treaties and conventions
with certain countries in which it obligates itself to surrender,
64. See Charles Cheney Hyde, The Extradition Case of Samuel Insull, Sr., In Relation to
Greece, 28 AM.J. INrT'L L. 307, 311 (1934).
65. See id. at 311 (quoting U.S. Department of State Press Release dated Nov. 5,
1933).
66. Id.
67. See WnrrEMiAN, supra note 14, at 1002. The dispute was resolved in 1937 when
the two governments signed a Protocol under which it was agreed that, under the
treaty, "the court or magistrate considering the request for extradition shall examine
only into the sufficiency of the evidence submitted by the demanding government to
justify the apprehension and commitment for trial of the person charged .... " Id. at
1002-03.
68. SeeJimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962).
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when a proper case is made out under the treaty or conven-
tion, individuals in this country who stand charged with or
convicted of crimes in the other country. Reciprocally, the
other country undertakes a corresponding obligation with re-
spect to fugitives from justice of the United States found in
that country.
Of course, the effectiveness of the extradition treaty system
depends on how these treaties are interpreted and imple-
mented. Should an accused in an extradition case, either in
this country or the other country concerned, be allowed to
present evidence in defense, the requesting country would
likely be forced to produce further and rebutting evidence
unless it wished to abandon the extradition entirely. It seems
clear that this procedure inevitably would lead to what we be-
lieve is quite clearly not contemplated by Congress, the
courts, or the Executive under our treaties and laws nor, in
fact, by the parties to the extradition treaty; that is, a full scale
trial of the accused in the requested country....
The proper interpretation and implementation of the extra-
dition agreements and the statutes affects not only the ability
of this Government to fulfill obligations under the applicable
treaty or convention with a foreign Government, but also its
ability to obtain the benefits of such agreements. The man-
ner in which this Government interprets and executes an ex-
tradition agreement with a foreign country will doubtless af-
fect the treatment given extradition requests the United
States makes to that country.
69
III. INROADS INTO THE RULE OF NON-CONTRADICTION
While U.S. courts have consistently endorsed the Rule of
Non-Contradiction in principle, they have varied with respect to
its practical implementation. As shown below, some courts have
sought ways to alleviate the harshness of the Rule. Certain
courts have simply ignored the Rule. For example, in United
States ex rel. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 70 the accused was charged by
the Government of Yugoslavia with war crimes, including mass
murder, committed during World War II. The extradition mag-
69. Letter from Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State, to Robert Kennedy, Attorney
General (Apr. 20, 1961), reprinted in WHrrEmAN, supra note 14, at 999-1000.
70. United States ex reL Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
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istrate permitted the accused to present "live witnesses" who "tes-
tified that the [government's] affiants were not telling the
truth.""' The court did not discuss or acknowledge the Rule of
Non-Contradiction.7 2 The extradition magistrate denied extra-
dition, finding both a lack of probable cause and that the al-
leged crimes were protected, non-extraditable political of-
fenses.73
Many years later, the government renewed its extradition re-
quest, and this time extradition was granted.74 The earlier deci-
sion has been described by the Seventh Circuit as "one of the
most roundly criticized cases in the history of American extradi-
tion jurisprudence, "7 primarily for its ruling that World War II
atrocities were non-extraditable political offenses.
Another case with political overtones was a 1959 case,
Argento v. Jacobs.76 In 1931, the accused had been convicted in
absentia in Italy on a charge of murder. The accusing witnesses
later recanted their testimony, claiming they had been coerced
by officers of the fascist regime that ruled Italy at the time. Years
later, the Government of Italy demanded extradition. The extra-
dition magistrate certified the accused for extradition. The dis-
trict court issued a writ of habeas corpus, relying heavily on the
recantations and the allegations of coercion. Again, the court
did not discuss or acknowledge the Rule of Non-Contradiction.
The first reported case that purported to apply the Rule,
71. Id. at 390.
72. Id. The court cited Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 42 S. Ct. 469, 66 L. Ed. 956
(1922), and Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 33 S. Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274 (1913), see
supra text accompanying notes 57-62, only for the principle that at an extradition hear-
ing probable cause is determined in accordance with the law of the state in which the
proceeding takes place. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. at 389. Cf. supra note 39.
73. Id. at 393. Most extradition treaties prohibit extradition for "political of-
fenses." See Steven Lubet & Morris Czackes, The Role of the AmericanJudiciary in the Extra-
dition of Political Terrorists, 71J. CriM. L. & CIMINOLOGY 193 (1980). There is substantial
case law and a large body of literature concerning the "political offense exception." See,
e.g., CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIjNGAERT, THE POLrCAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADi-
TION (1980); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that Irish Repub-
lican Army attack on British army patrol, committed in furtherance of uprising in
Northern Ireland, was protected political offense); In re Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (refusing to find that armed attack by Abu Nidal terrorist on civilian
passenger bus was protected political offense).
74. In re Artukovic, 628 F. Supp. 1370 (C.D. Cal. 1985), stay denied, 784 F.2d 1354
(9th Cir. 1986).
75. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 522 (7th Cir. 1981).
76. Argento v. Jacobs, 176 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
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but in fact deviated from it, was the 1931 decision in In re Mertz."
The accused was a U.S. federal agent who was investigating nar-
cotics trafficking near the U.S.-Canadian border. Working un-
dercover with the knowledge and approval of Canadian law en-
forcement authorities, he arrested a drug dealer on the U.S. side
of the border, and later shot and killed him as he tried to escape.
The Government of Canada charged the agent with murder and
demanded his extradition. A disputed issue was whether the
shooting had occurred on U.S. or Canadian soil. The govern-
ment offered eyewitness testimony that the shooting had oc-
curred on the Canadian side of the border.78 Over the govern-
ment's objection, the accused introduced evidence that the
shooting had occurred on the U.S. side.79 The extradition mag-
istrate admitted the accused's evidence, found it "convincing," 0
and made a factual determination that the shooting had oc-
curred on U.S. soil.8 ' Finding that no crime had been commit-
ted in Canada, the court refused to certify the accused for extra-
dition. 2 The court acknowledged the Rule of Non-Contradic-
tion, but justified admission of evidence that the shooting had
occurred within the United States on the rationale that the evi-
dence "explain[ed]" the government's proof.8 4
The facts of a related case highlight the political nature of
the Mertz decision. In Vaccaro v. Collier,5 a different court certi-
fied for extradition the agent's informant, sought by the Govern-
ment of Canada in connection with the same incident. Never-
theless, Secretary of State Cordell Hull refused to extradite the
informant.8 6 Explaining his decision to the Canadian Minister,
77. In re Mertz, 52 F.2d 241 (S.D. Tex. 1931).
78. Id. at 245.
79. Id. at 242.
80. Id. at 245.
81. Id. at 246.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 242-43.
84. Id. at 243.
85. Vaccaro v. Collier, 38 F.2d 862 (D. Md. 1930) (issuing writ of habeas corpus
following extradition magistrate's certification of extraditability), af/d in part and rev'd
in part, 51 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1931) (overturning writ and allowing extradition to go
forward on certain charges). The informant was sought as an accessory to the murder,
and also for kidnapping another member of the drug ring. The court allowed extradi-
tion to go forward only on the kidnapping charge. Id.
86. The Secretary of State has full discretion whether or not to extradite. 18 U.S.c.
§ 3186 (1999). See, e.g., Emami v. District Court, 834 F.2d 1444, 1453-54 (9th Cir.
1987); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th Cir. 1980); Peroffv. Hylton,
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the Secretary of State cited the fact that Canadian law enforce-
ment officials had approved of the undercover investigation and
had even congratulated their U.S. counterparts immediately af-
ter the incident."' The Secretary of State also noted the conflict-
ing evidence as to where the shooting had occurred, and the
passage of four years between the shooting and the time the ex-
tradition request was made. 8
While Mertz has almost never been cited, a 1960 case, In re
D'Amico89 has been cited as authority by courts seeking to side-
step the Rule. The accused was charged by the Government of
Italy with kidnapping. The government's evidence consisted of
the inculpatory confessions of two alleged accomplices, both of
whom later recanted, and the fact that the victim had been held
in a shack on property owned by the accused.9" The extradition
magistrate certified the accused for extradition. Counsel for the
accused did not challenge probable cause at the extradition
hearing.9'
The accused then obtained new counsel, who challenged
the determination of probable cause via habeas corpus review.
9 2
The district court reopened the extradition hearing and re-
manded to the extradition magistrate for further proceedings on
the probable cause issue. The district court ruled that at the
hearing the accused would be permitted to offer explanatory evi-
dence concerning the shack, namely, that it was located in a re-
mote area of the accused's property where the accused seldom
ventured.93 The court ruled, consistently with the Rule of Non-
Contradiction, that such evidence was being "offered to explain"
563 F.2d 1099, 1102 (4th Cir. 1977); Shapiro v. Secretary of State, 499 F.2d 527, 531
(D.C. Cir. 1974), af'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976).
87. See Note dated July 18, 1934 from Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Canadian
Minister Herridge, MS Department of State, file 211.42 Vaccaro, Sarro/62, reprinted in
part in 4 GREEN HA wOOD HACKWORTH, DiGEsr OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 162-63 (1942);
see also JeffreyJ. Carlisle, Extradition of Government Agents as a Municipal Law Remedy for
State-Sponsored Kidnapping, 81 CAuF. L. Rxv. 1541, 1568 (1993).
88. See HAcKwoRTH, supra note 87, at 163. There were also indications that the
request for extradition had only been made after the deceased's widow had been unsuc-
cessful in attempts to negotiate compensation for her husband's death with the U.S.
Government. Vaccaro, 38 F.2d at 871.
89. In re D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
90. Id. at 928-29.
91. Id. at 926.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 929.
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the government's proof, and was therefore admissible.94 The
court then turned to the two accomplice confessions. The court
noted that "[w]here, as here, such testimony has been com-
pletely recanted, its probative value is thin indeed, '9 5 causing
"grave doubt"9 6 that there was probable cause.
The recantation was part of the government's documentary
evidence, and, in a technical sense, was not being introduced by
the accused to contradict the government's proof. Nevertheless,
in instructing the extradition magistrate concerning the prob-
able cause issue, the district court was expressly taking into ac-
count, and giving substantial weight to, evidence that contra-
dicted the very essence of the government's proof-the inculpa-
tory confessions. The court did this even as it was citing, and
purporting to apply, some of the leading cases on the Rule of
Non-Contradiction.97
After D'Amico, two decisions of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York abided by the Rule but inad-
vertently paved the way for the Rule's subsequent erosion. In
Shapiro v. Ferrandina,98 the accused was charged by the Govern-
ment of Israel with fraud. The allegation was that he and an
accomplice had set up an investment fund and had falsely repre-
sented to investors that their investments were guaranteed by a
bank.99 In support of probable cause, the government intro-
duced the testimony of four witnesses who stated that the ac-
cused had made the false representations at issue.100 The ac-
cused sought to call other witnesses to testify, inter alia, that he
had not made the statements.10'
The extradition magistrate refused to allow the contradic-
tory evidence. On habeas corpus review, the district court agreed.
Reciting the Rule of Non-Contradiction, 0 2 the district court
went further, stating:
94. Id. at 930.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 931.
98. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 355 F. Supp. 563, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
99. Id. at 571.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 572.
102. See id. "the fugitive has a right to introduce evidence ... limited to testimony
which explains rather than contradicts the demanding country's proof...." (quoting
United States ex re. Petrushansky v. Marasco, 325 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1963)).
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While the process of definition is difficult in the area of
"probable cause" perhaps it is enough to say that what tends
to obliterate probable cause may be considered but not what
merely contradicts it. The improbability or the vagueness of
testimony may destroy the probability of guilt, but the tender-
ing of witnesses who testify to an opposite version of the facts
does not. The latter must await trial on the merits.'
0 3
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, stating that the dis-
trict court had properly refused to allow the accused to intro-
duce the evidence that he had not made the representations:
"[i] f allowed, such statements would in no way "explain"-or, as
the district judge put it, "obliterat"-the government's evidence,
but would only pose a conflict of credibility. Such a contest, the
judge permissibly ruled, should properly await trial in Israel."' 4
The Second Circuit thus correctly understood the district
court's use of the word "obliterate" to be, in effect, a synonym
for "explain." Nothing in either the district court's opinion or in
the opinion of the Court of Appeals suggests that either court
intended the term "obliterate" to describe a special case of evi-
dence that "contradicts." To the contrary, both courts expressly
stated that a "conflict of credibility" would not "obliterate" the
government's case.' °5
In re Sindona'0 was the other Southern District of New York
case that inadvertently paved the way for subsequent erosion of
the Rule. Sindona had been charged by the Government of Italy
with engineering a massive fraud that led to the collapse of sev-
eral banks. At the extradition hearing, Sindona did not dispute
the fact that there had been substantial transfers of funds from
the banks to his companies.' 0 7 He sought to introduce evidence,
inter alia, that the transfers were duly authorized loans, and that
the collapse of the banks had not been caused by his actions but
by other circumstances. 0 8
Invoking the Rule of Non-Contradiction, the extradition
magistrate refused to admit Sindona's evidence. Although the
proffered evidence was arguably "explanatory," the court limited
103. i. (emphasis added).
104. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
105. Id.; Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 355 F. Supp. 563, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
106. In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
107. Id. at 684.
108. Id. at 684-85.
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"explanatory evidence" to "reasonably clear-cut proof which
would be of limited scope and have some reasonable chance of
negating a showing of probable cause.... [T]he extraditee can-
not be allowed to turn the extradition hearing into a full trial on
the merits."109 After summarizing Sindona's "extensive" 110 and
highly complex offer of proof,"' the court concluded that
"Sindona's offer of exculpatory proof does not fall within the
area of 'explanatory' evidence contemplated by the cases.
Sindona's contentions raise issues appropriate for presentation
at a full trial in Italy; but they do not negate the probable cause
showing of the Italian government .... 1 12
The court in Sindona thus intended to reduce, not increase,
the scope of evidence that may be offered by an accused in an
extradition proceeding. Although Sindona proffered evidence
that was arguably "explanatory" of the government's proof, the
fact that it was not also of "limited scope" 113 and "reasonably
clear-cut"" 4 precluded its admissibility. By introducing the word
"negate" into the formulation of the Rule of Non-Contradiction,
the Sindona court was restricting, not expanding, the rights of
the accused, by limiting the admissibility of explanatory evi-
dence. Nothing in the opinion remotely suggests that the court
was expanding the accused's right so as to allow introduction of
contradictory evidence that "negates" probable cause.
Prior to the Shapiro decision," 5 courts had not used the
word "obliterate" in connection with the Rule of Non-Contradic-
tion. Prior to the Sindona decision, 1 6 courts had not used the
word "negate" in connection with the Rule. Since those deci-
sions, however, many courts have adopted and incorporated the
word "obliterate,""17 or "negate,"118 or both," 9 into their formu-
109. Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
110. Id
111. Id. at 685-87.
112. Id. at 687 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 685.
114. Id.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 98-105.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 106-14.
117. See, e.g., Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252, 1266 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
(citing Shapiro); In re Mainero, 990 F. Supp. 1208, 1218 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Sha-
piro), aj]'d sub nom. Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1207 n.7 (9th Cir. 1999) ("evi-
dence that explains away or completely obliterates probable cause is the only evidence
admissible at an extradition hearing."); Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 104041
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that expert testimony proffered by accused "would not serve
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lations of the Rule of Non-Contradiction.
Until 1985, no reported opinion concluded that contradic-
tory evidence proffered by an accused was admissible because it
"negated" or "obliterated" probable cause. The opinion in Re-
public of France v. Moghadam,120 marks the first time an extradi-
tion magistrate refused to certify an accused for extradition on
the ground that the accused's proffered contradictory evidence
"negated" the government's showing of probable cause.121
The accused, Moghadam, was sought for narcotics offenses.
A certain Custer had been arrested at the airport in Paris and
found to have heroin and opium in her luggage. She was carry-
ing a letter that implicated Moghadam, a convicted drug
dealer, 2 2 in the smuggling attempt.123 She told the French in-
vestigating magistrate 124 that Moghadam had arranged for her to
transport the narcotics and deliver them to him in San Fran-
cisco.' 2 5 She claimed that at some point during her journey, she
to 'explain' or 'obliterate' the government's evidence, so much as to pose a conflict in
the testimony of two handwriting experts"); In re Powell, 4 F. Supp. 2d 945, 959 (S.D.
Cal. 1998) (stating that accused is "foreclosed from raising the defense of duress in the
extradition hearing, as the defense is more appropriately offered before the court of
jurisdiction."); In re Garcia, 890 F. Supp. 914, 923-24 (S.D. Cal. 1994) ("it has been held
appropriate to permit evidence that tends to obliterate probable cause"); In re Greer,
Misc. No. 91-90, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19515, at *15-16 (D. Vt. Nov. 20, 1991) ("Explan-
atory evidence is evidence that 'obliterates' probable cause, not merely contradictory
evidence.") (citing Shapiro); In re Okeke, No. 96-7019P-01, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22379,
at *11 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 1996) (citing Shapiro); In re Sandhu, 90 Cr. Misc. No. 1, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7314, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1997) (citing Shapiro).
118. See, e.g., Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 175 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Sindona);
In re Schweidenback, 3 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing Sindona); In re
Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 795 (D. Conn. 1997) (citing Sindona); Lindstrom v. Gilkey,
No. 98 C 5191, 1999 WL 342320, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 1999) (citing Sindona).
119. See, e.g., Cheng Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 734 F. Supp. 988, 995 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
("[E]xtraditee cannot avoid extradition simply by contradicting the requesting coun-
try's case. Rather, the extraditee must 'negate' or 'obliterate' the requesting country's
showing of probable cause.") (quoting Cheng); In re Ntakirutimana, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22173, at *78 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 1998) (quoting Cheng); Martin v. Warden, 804 F.
Supp. 1530, 1533 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (quoting Cheng), afftd, 993 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1993);
Ludecke v. Marshal, 15 F.3d 496,499 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting accused's argument that
"their evidence in opposition to the request for extradition negated and obliterated all
the allegations made by the German government").
120. Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
121. Id. at 783.
122. Id at 784.
123. Id. at 778.
124. See supra note 43 for a brief discussion of the role of investigating magistrates
in certain countries.
125. Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. at 778.
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had called Moghadam from a hotel to report that all was well. 126
Telephone records confirmed that Custer had called a phone
number belonging to Moghadam's brother-in-law. 27 From a
French prison, Custer wrote a letter to the U.S. Drug Enforce-
ment Administration ("D.EA.") offering to provide evidence
against Moghadam if she were transferred from the French jail
to a U.S. jail.' 28
The Government of France requested that the United States
extradite Moghadam to France for his role in the importation.
The U.S. Attorney in San Francisco commenced an extradition
proceeding. At the extradition hearing, Moghadam sought to
introduce evidence that Custer had later written a letter re-
canting the accusation made in her letter to the D.E.A.' 29 Custer
had subsequently withdrawn the recantation and had reasserted
the original accusation.'
Citing D'Amico for the proposition that an extradition mag-
istrate could take into account "the fact that testimony against
the defendant was recanted by the witness,"' the court stated
that "[t]he most significant aspect of the probable cause deter-
mination is Custer's recantation letter which was later with-
drawn."'1 32 Analyzing the facts surrounding Custer's accusation,
recantation, and re-accusation, the court concluded that
"Custer's recantation appears to have more indicia of reliability
than the original accusations."' 3 The court based this conclu-
sion largely on the fact that the accusations were "self-serving"
and had been motivated by Custer's stated desire to be trans-
ferred out of the French jail, whereas the recantation worked
directly against that interest.13 4
The court acknowledged the Rule of Non-Contradiction,
but stated that Custer's recantation went beyond "the mere pres-
126. Id.
127. Id, at 779 n.2. At the extradition hearing, the accused was properly permitted
to offer evidence explaining that Custer's fiance worked for the accused's brother-in-
law and often received calls at that number. Id.
128. Id. at 779.
129. See id. at 780 ("[T]he government never brought the recantation letter to the
attention of the court or the defendant.").
130. Id-
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entation of witnesses who testify as to an opposite version of the
facts."'85 Here, according to the court, the recantation "negate[d]
the only evidence of probable cause.' 3 6 Concluding that the
government had failed to establish probable cause, the court de-
nied extradition.
Moghadam was the first reported case in which a court,
though purporting to adhere to the Rule of Non-Contradiction,
contrasted the credibility of an accusation, offered by the gov-
ernment, against that of its recantation, offered by the accused,
and denied extradition on the ground that the recantation evi-
dence was more credible than the accusation evidence.
Moghadam thus represents a significant departure from the Rule
of Non-Contradiction, despite the court's striving to characterize
its holding as consistent with the Rule by emphasizing the com-
plete negation of probable cause.' 3 7 Ironically, the "negation" as-
pect of the Rule originated with Sindona, where the court used
the phrase with the intent to reduce, not increase, the right of
the accused to introduce evidence at an extradition hearing.1
3 8
Two subsequent cases, In re Contreras" 9 and Maguna-Celaya
v. Haro,140 rely upon the breakthrough established in Moghadam.
In both cases, witnesses made confessions that inculpated the ac-
cused, and later recanted them. In both cases, the courts found
that the recantations contained greater indicia of reliability than
the original accusations, and, as result, ruled that the recanta-
tion evidence negated probable cause.
In Contreras, eleven witnesses had been arrested in a house
containing illegal firearms. They each signed a statement, pre-
pared for them by Mexican police, inculpating the accused as
the supplier of the weapons. Pursuant to Mexican procedure,
two days later the witnesses were brought before a Mexican
judge, where they were asked to affirm their statements. At that
time, all eleven recanted their accusations. The witnesses
claimed that they had been threatened and physically coerced
135. Id.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 109-15.
139. In re Contreras, 800 F. Supp. 1462 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
140. Maguna-Celaya v. Haro, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 1998), rev'd mem., 172
F.3d 883 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 410, 145 L. Ed.2d 320
(1999).
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into signing the statements. 141
At the extradition hearing, the government relied upon the
eleven accusatory statements to establish probable cause. The
defense sought to introduce evidence of the recantations, as well
as evidence that physical coercion had been brought to bear
against the eleven witnesses in order to induce them to sign the
accusatory statements.142 The extradition magistrate acknowl-
edged the Rule of Non-Contradiction, noting that evidence "ex-
plaining away or completely rebutting" probable cause is admis-
sible, while evidence "that merely controverts the government's
probable cause evidence, or raises a defense.., is excluded."143
The court identified the issue before it as "whether recantation
testimony is deemed rebutting or explanatory which would be
admissible since it explains away or destroys the existence of
probable cause.""4 Citing Sindona for the principle that evi-
dence "negating" probable cause is admissible, 4 and Moghadam
for the principle that "recantation evidence rebutting probable
cause" is admissible, 46 the court concluded that
where the indicia of reliability is on the prior inculpating
statement, then a recantation, if admitted, would not negate
the existence of probable cause; or if the recantation only
controverted a prior inculpating statement, then it would not
rebut the probable cause evidence. However, where a prior
statement is shown to be coerced and the indicia of reliability
is on the recantation, then the subsequent statement negating
the existence of probable cause is gennane.' 47
The court ruled that, in light of the immediate and uniform
recantation by all eleven witnesses, as well as other facts, 48
141. Contreras, 800 F. Supp. at 1466-68.
142. Id
143. Id at 1464.
144. Id. at 1465.
145. Id. at 1464.
146. Id. at 1469.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1468. These facts included that the retractions occurred in open court
at ajudicial hearing in Mexico, where the witness is required to "declare" that his state-
ment or confession is accurate and then "adopt" it before the court. Id. at 1466. The
court noted that the witnesses "took the first opportunity to retract the prior state-
ments, knowing that they may have subjected themselves and their families to retribu-
tion." Id. at 1468. Also, the original confessions were not written in the form of first
person narratives. Rather, they were "affidavits" from the Mexican officials who were
present when the statements were made. Id at 1465. Thus, "the incriminating state-
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"[a]ny indicia of reliability would be on the subsequent retrac-
tions" rather than on the original accusations. 49 Extradition was
denied.
The facts of Maguna-Celaya v. Haro'50 are arguably less com-
pelling for the accused than those in Contreras, but the outcome
in the district court was the same. 151 The accused was sought by
the Government of Spain in connection with various acts of vio-
lence allegedly committed by Basque separatists.' 5 2 The govern-
ment's evidence in support of probable cause consisted of the
confessions of four individuals, each inculpating the accused.
One of the four had recanted the confession within a day. The
other three had waited almost nine years before claiming, after
being contacted by counsel for the accused, that they had been
coerced into confessing.1
5
Citing the Rule of Non-Contradiction, the extradition mag-
istrate noted that the recantation evidence presented a conflict
that could only be resolved at trial in Spain.' 54 The extradition
magistrate found that the government had established probable
cause and certified the accused for extradition. 5 The accused
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Citing Shapiro for the principle that the accused was entitled
to "obliterate" probable cause,'56 and Contreras for the principle
that the accused may "obliterate" probable cause by showing that
ments were not of the [witness'] own making, but were pre-written statements that only
required his signature." Id. at 1468. At the declaration hearing in Mexico, the 11 wit-
nesses variously testified that parts of the written confessions were not contained in the
statements as originally signed by them; that they recognized their signatures on the
confessions, but not the written contents, or, alternatively, that the written contents
were untrue; and that they were not permitted to read the documents that they were
forced to sign. Id. at 1466-68. Finally, the court noted that the facts, if true, showed
that the 11 had been physically coerced and tortured into giving their confessions. Id.
at 1468.
149. Ia. at 1469.
150. Maguna-Celaya v. Haro, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
151. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. See infra text accompanying notes 163-168.
152. Maguna-Celaya, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1338-39.
153. I. at 1344.
154. See id. at 1341 (citing magistrate's Order Certifying Extradition). Although
not reflected in the published opinion of the habeas corpus judge, the extradition mag-
istrate alternatively found that the recantations were not sufficiently reliable to under-
mine the earlier statements. Id. This finding formed the basis for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's subsequent reversal of the district court. Maguna-Celaya v. Reno, Slip Op., No.
98-5604 (11th Cir. Feb. 4, 1999). See infra text accompanying note 163-68.
155. Maguna-Celaya, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
156. Id. at 1343.
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the government's evidence was obtained via coercion, 57 the dis-
trict court granted the writ of habeas corpus. 158 The court found
that "the evidence favors reliability of the recantations over that
of the original statements,"'59 and "completely negates the exist-
ence of probable cause." 160 The court then went even further,
and formulated a new exception to the Rule of Non-Contradic-
tion:
When all the evidence presented by the Government in an
extradition proceeding is credibly tainted, thereby obliterating
probable cause, ... the burden should shift to the Govern-
ment to come forward with independent evidence that the
relator committed the crimes charged. Such a rule would
protect the Court's preeminent duty to guard against due
process violations. 161
The government appealed from the order issuing the writ
of habeas corpus."6 2 The Eleventh Circuit reversed.16 3 In an un-
published opinion, the Court of Appeals ruled that, "[a]ssuming
arguendo"'64 the evidence of coercion and recantation could be
considered in an extradition proceeding, the habeas corpus
judge had failed "to afford the appropriate deference" to the fac-
tual findings of the extradition magistrate. 165 The extradition
magistrate, while concluding that the recantation evidence was
"likely inadmissible,' 66 held that, in any event, "the recantations
were not sufficiently reliable to undermine the witnesses' earlier
statements."1 67  The habeas corpus judge was not entitled to
make a de novo factual determination.16 8
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1345.
159. Id. at 1344.
160. Id. at 1345 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 1344.
162. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 478 comment c (1987) [hereinafter "RESTATEMENT"] (explaining that
government may not appeal from extradition magistrate's refusal to certify accused for
extradition, but may appeal from grant of writ of habeas corpus).
163. Maguna-Celaya, Slip Op., No. 98-5604.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Maguna-Celaya v. Haro, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
167. Maguna-Celaya, Slip Op. No. 98-5604, at n. 1.
168. It is well-established that the habeas corpus judge may not engage in de novo
fact-finding on the probable cause issue; rather, the scope of habeas corpus review of
that issue is limited to whether there is "any evidence" to support the finding of prob-
able cause. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925); Demjanjuk v. Pe-
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Maguna-Celaya filed a certiorari petition with the Supreme
Court, and obtained a stay of extradition from Justice Anthony
Kennedy pending determination of the petition.169 The full
Court, however, denied certiorari.170 Thus, while the outcome
in Maguna-Celaya was, in the end, favorable to the government,
the process that led to it contravened the Rule of Non-Contra-
diction.
The most extreme deviation from the Rule of Non-Contra-
diction took place in Gonzalez,'7 the case that introduces this
Article.172 In Gonzalez, the court held that alibi evidence "negat-
ing" probable cause is admissible in circumstances where the
Government's probable cause evidence lacks reliability and the
trovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 1985); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 790 (9th
Cir. 1986).
169. See Justice Blocks Basque Extradition, WAsH. NEws, Aug. 13, 1999.
170. Maguna-Celaya v. Haro, - U.S. , 120 S.Ct. 410, 120 L. Ed. 2d. 320 (1999).
In his certiorari petition, Maguna-Celaya argued that the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (or "Convention")
39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/506 (1984), entered into force Nov.
20, 1994, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as mod. 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) [hereinafter
"Convention"], prohibited consideration of evidence obtained by torture. See Justice
Blocks Basque Extradition, WAsH. NEws, Aug. 13, 1999. The Convention obligates signa-
tory countries (now including the United States) to ensure that "any statement which is
established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in
any proceedings..." Convention, supra, at art. 15. Some commentators have argued
that, as a result of the Convention, U.S. courts should refuse to consider evidence se-
cured through torture. See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, Symposium on Parliamentay Partic-
ipation in the Making and Operation of Treaties: United States: The Role of the United States
Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI-KENT L. Rxv.
515, 520 (1991). However, when the U.S. Senate consented to ratification of the Con-
vention, it specified in a special declaration that the Convention not be deemed "self-
executing." 136 Cong. Rec. S17,492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). President Bill Clinton
ratified the Convention subject to the Senate's qualification that the Convention be
deemed non-self-executing. SeeJohn Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and Human Rights
Treaties, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 1213, 1229-30 (1996). Only when a treaty provision is self-
executing does it vests individuals with legal rights enforceable in court. See Jacques
Semmelman, The Doctrine of Specialty in the Federal Courts: Making Sense of United States v.
Rauscher, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 71, 72-73 (1993). A non-self-executing treaty "is unavailing
to the litigant relying on it in court." Carlos M. Vasquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies
of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1121 (1992). Accordingly, the Convention may
not be invoked by an accused in a U.S. extradition proceeding as a basis for excluding
evidence allegedly elicited through torture. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340A, 2340B (1999)
(implementing Convention by creating federal crime of torture, and expressly disclaim-
ing creation of "any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in
any civil proceeding."); 22 C.F.R § 95.4 (1999).
171. In re Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725 (W.D. La. 1999).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 1-9.
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alibi evidence is credible and persuasive. 173 While the alibi evi-
dence was admitted in the context of a bail hearing, the issue
was whether the government would likely meet its burden of es-
tablishing probable cause at the extradition hearing. By admit-
ting alibi evidence in connection with this issue at the bail hear-
ing, the court effectively was opening the door to alibi evidence
at the extradition hearing.
The court found the Government's probable cause evi-
dence, which consisted of highly suggestive photo identifica-
tions, 174 to be unreliable. 7 5 The court permitted the defendants
to take the stand and also to call alibi witnesses, whom the court
found to be credible.' 76 The court concluded that the defend-
ants had a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits at
the extradition hearing, and found that to be a "special circum-
stance" warranting release on bail.' 77
In analyzing whether it was proper to allow the defendants
to present alibi evidence, the court conducted an "exhaustive re-
view" of case law involving alibi evidence at extradition hear-
ings."78 The court attempted to distinguish the cases in which
alibi evidence was held inadmissible, on the ground that "each
involve[d] substantial probable cause evidence, unlike the in-
stant case."' 79
Citing Contreras and the district court's opinion in Maguna-
Celaya, the court stated, "[a]lthough the instant case does not
involve recantations of witnesses, it does involve a situation
where the reliability of the government's identification is in
question. In such a situation, the admission of evidence tending
to negate probable cause is equally valid .... ,1o The court held
that "[e]vidence of an alibi defense is... admissible if it negates
")181or obliterates probable cause...
Gonzalez expands the holdings of Contreras and Maguna-Ce-
laya to allow evidence of an alibi defense. The case stands for
173. Gonza/Z, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 741.
174. Id. at 737. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
175. Id. at 737.
176. Id. at 733, 741.
177. Id. at 737.
178. Id. at 739 (citing cases).
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. Id. at 740 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 739 (emphasis added).
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the proposition that alibi evidence is admissible whenever the
government's probable cause evidence lacks reliability and
where credible alibi evidence exists that "undermines, or 'ne-
gates' the existence of probable cause."11 2
These cases-Moghadam, Contreras, Maguna-Celaya, and Gon-
zalez-are extremely problematic. Evidence of recantation does
not "explain" the government's case; it contradicts the govern-
ment's case.'8 3  Evidence of recantation does not, to use the
Supreme Court's phraseology, "explain[ ] ambiguities or doubt-
ful elements" in the government's proof.'8 4 Rather, it repudiates
the government's proof by calling it false. Alibi evidence like-
wise does not "explain" the government's case; it contradicts
it.185 Because each of these reported cases' 8 6 entail credibility
182. Id. at 741.
183. See Eain v. Adams, 529 F. Supp. 685, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (excluding evidence
of recantation because "[t]he accused does not have the right to contradict the de-
manding country's proof"); affd sub nom. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 511 (7th Cir.
1981) ("[tlhe later statements do not explain the government's evidence, rather they
tend to contradict or challenge the credibility of the facts implicating petitioner").
184. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 315 (1922).
185. Eain, 641 F.2d at 512 (holding that alibi evidence "directly contradicts the
government's proof" that accused committed crime charged on certain day); In re
Okeke, No. 96-7019P-01, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22379, at *13 (D.NJ. Sept. 5, 1996)
("[T]he proffered evidence of alibi directly contradicts" the accusing witness' state-
ment, and therefore "the Court must exclude this evidence from consideration.");
Desmond v. Eggers, 18 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1927) (holding that alibi evidence
"would necessarily tend to contradict the testimony of [the government's) witnesses.").
186. Courts in other cases have considered evidence of recantation but have con-
cluded, based upon the facts, either that recantation had not actually occurred, or that
the recantations were not reliable. See In re Garcia, 890 F. Supp. 914, 923-24 (S.D. Cal.
1994) (finding, as factual matter, that witnesses had not recanted their accusations
"when first given the opportunity to recant and thus 'obliterate' their prior statements
and thus 'obliterate' probable cause, the co-conspirators did just the opposite, i.e., they
reaffirmed and adopted their prior statements almost in their entirety"); In re Mainero,
990 F. Supp. 1208, 1222, 1226 (S.D. Cal. 1997) ("The essential question is whether the
indicia of reliability is on the recantation or the initial statement"; finding, based upon
the facts, that "[t]he indicia of reliability is in favor of" the initial accusations "and not
their in court 'recantations.'"), affd, 164 F.3d 1199, 1207 n.7 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating
because extradition magistrate allowed recantation evidence, "we need not reach the
question whether recantation evidence is admissible in an extradition hearing."); Boba-
dilla v. Reno, 826 F. Supp. 1428, 1434 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (admitting and considering
recantation evidence, but concluding that probable cause exists). Although the out-
comes in these cases were favorable to the government, the cases suffer from the same
conceptual infirmities present in the cases in which the outcome favored the accused,
i.e., the extradition magistrates admitted contradictory evidence proffered by the ac-
cused and made a credibility determination. See also Sandhu v. Burke, 97 Civ. 4608
(JGK), 2000 WL 191707, at * 16 (Feb. 10, 2000) (remanding for further proceedings
and noting that "the consideration of recantations is consistent with the principle that
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determinations based upon evidence introduced by the accused,
they undermine the premise of the Rule of Non-Contradiction-
that an extradition hearing is neither a trial on the merits, nor
should it become one.1
8 7
Moreover, these cases fail to provide practical standards for
deciding when to enforce the Rule of Non-Contradiction and
when to disregard it. Some recantations are more credible than
original confessions, while other recantations are not. As with
most credibility conflicts, deciding whether a recantation is more
credible than the original confession is best made with the wit-
nesses in court so that the fact finder can observe their de-
meanor.' Similarly, some alibi witnesses are credible while
others are not. Credibility of an alibi witness is best assessed with
the witness before the court.
Moghadam, Contreras, and Maguna-Celaya should not fall
outside of the Rule of Non-Contradiction because they involved
recantations made by the government's own witnesses. Recanta-
tion gives rise to an issue of fact as to which of the witness' state-
ments is true-the original accusation or the subsequent recan-
tation. In the domestic context, if a government witness has
given inculpatory testimony before a federal grand jury, only to
recant and to refuse to inculpate the defendant at trial, then the
government is entitled to offer the grand jury testimony at trial
an extradition magistrate may consider evidence that tends to obliterate probable
cause.").
187. See supra notes 18-19, 25, 40, 55, 60, 69 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Atkins, 545 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1976) ("The District
Court, after hearing [the government's witness'] recanted testimony and observing his
demeanor, found that [he] had told the truth at trial and that his recanted testimony
was not credible."); see also International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257,
1265 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Only through live cross-examination can the fact-finder observe
the demeanor of a witness, and assess his credibility."); Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 94
n.3 (4th Cir. 1991) ("The case resolves itself into numerous credibility determinations
arising from sharply conflicting testimony. Gray's version may not be believed. How-
ever, belief or nonbelief is a function of the finder of fact, not of the judge or magis-
trate judge."); Wood v. Allstate Insurance Co., 21 F.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 1994). In
1949, Judge Jerome Frank, writing for a Second Circuit panel that included Judge
Learned Hand, said:
Trial on oral testimony, with the opportunity to examine and cross-examine
witnesses in open court, has often been acclaimed as one of the persistent,
distinctive, and most valuable features of the common-law system. For only in
such a trial can the trier of facts (trial judge or jury) observe the witnesses'
demeanor; and that demeanor-absent, of course, when the trial is by affidavit
or deposition-is recognized as an important clue to the witness' credibility.
Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949).
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as part of its evidence-in-chief.' 9 The trial jury decides whether
to believe the accusatory testimony or the recantation, taking
into account all of the evidence in the case.' 9 ° In the analogous
extradition context, to allow an extradition magistrate to decide
which version to believe, and to deny extradition if the accused's
evidence is deemed more credible than the government's evi-
dence, improperly pre-empts trial in the requesting country.191
The distinction drawn by the courts in Moghadam, Contreras,
Maguna-Celaya, and Gonzalez-that contradictory evidence is ad-
missible so long as it "negates" or "obliterates" probable cause-
derives from Shapiro and Sindona and their progeny.'92 How-
ever, as discussed above,1 93 in neither Shapiro nor Sindona did
the court intend to allow the accused to introduce contradictory
evidence on an "obliteration" or "negation" rationale. If any-
thing, the Sindona court then limited even further the evidence
that an accused could introduce under the Rule. 9"
189. FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (1) (A); see, e.g., United States v. Mosley, 555 F.2d 191, 193
(8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Henry, 448 F. Supp. 819, 821 (D.N.J. 1978). This is
subject, of course, to other evidentiary principles such as relevance and competence.
190. See, eg., United States v. Hemmer, 729 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1984) (recanting
witness' "grandjury testimony was admissible as substantive evidence" at trial; "It was for
the jury to decide whether or not to credit it."); United States v. Holladay, 566 F.2d
1018, 1019 (5th Cir. 1978) ("It was for the jury to decide whether" to believe the testi-
mony of "a witness who recants or contradicts his prior testimony...").
191. Nor is there justification based upon the exclusionary rule, even where there
is evidence of coercion, as in Contreras and Maguna-Celaya. As a general matter, the
exclusionary rule does not apply in extradition proceedings, since its purpose is only to
regulate the conduct of U.S. law enforcement officers, not foreign police. See, e.g., In re
Powell, 4 F. Supp. 2d 945, 950-52 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Esposito v. Adams, 700 F. Supp.
1470, 1479 n.9 (N.D. Il1. 1988); Simmons v. Braun, 627 F.2d 635, 636-37 (2d Cir. 1980).
Although in a domestic criminal case, an involuntary confession by the accused would
be suppressed and excluded from the evidence at trial, see Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.
477, 92 S. Ct. 619, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1972), an indictment may be returned on the basis
of an involuntary or coerced confession. See In re Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032, 1052
(E.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Tapp, 812 F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Rivieccio, 723 F. Supp. 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248-
49, 31 S. Ct. 2, 54 L. Ed. 1021 (1910); see also Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 350,
78 S. Ct. 311, 2 L. Ed. 2d. 321 (1958); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344-45
(1974). Cf United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Tate,
329 F.2d 848, 853 (2d Cir. 1964). While an argument could be made in the domestic
context that a U.S. court may exercise its supervisory authority and dismiss such an
indictment, U.S. courts have no supervisory authority over foreign proceedings. See,
e.g., Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir. 1976).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 115-19.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 105-19.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 109-14.
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Shapiro and Sindona introduced, respectively, the words "ob-
literate" and "negate" into the formulation of the Rule of Non-
Contradiction. This language led other courts, in adopting the
terminology, to the erroneous principle that contradictory evi-
dence may be admitted if it negates or obliterates probable
cause. Because negation or obliteration via contradictory evi-
dence-such as evidence of recantation or alibi-requires a trial
on the merits to determine credibility, admission of such evi-
dence is fundamentally incompatible with U.S. extradition trea-
ties.19
5
IV. A PROPOSED STRUCTURE FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE
Circumstances may arise in which an accused has evidence
so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could reject it.
Such evidence is frequently presented in civil cases. Courts
presented with such evidence in civil cases grant summaryjudg-
ment.1
96
This Article proposes an approach to the Rule of Non-Con-
tradiction that draws upon standards of proof for a defendant to
obtain summary judgment in a civil case. Where the accused in
an extradition proceeding has evidence such that, in a civil case,
a court would grant summary judgment in favor of the accused,
the extradition magistrate should admit the evidence-even if it
provides a defense or contradicts the government's proof-and
should rule in favor of the accused. This approach helps ensure
the fairness of the extradition hearing, enhancing its due pro-
cess function, without transforming the hearing into a trial on
the merits. On the other hand, if the accused's contradictory
evidence merely gives rise to an issue of fact, the extradition
magistrate should adhere to the Rule of Non-Contradiction, and
should exclude the evidence. Only the requesting country's
courts should resolve disputed issues of fact.
The Supreme Court has held that at the summary judgment
stage in civil cases, the judge's function is not to weigh the evi-
dence and determine the truth of the matter, but rather "to de-
termine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."197 "Credibil-
195. See supra notes 18-19, 25, 40, 55, 60, 69 and accompanying text.
196. See FED. . Civ. P. 56.
197. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
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ity determinations" are to be made solely by the trier of fact at
trial.198 However, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,
there is no 'genuine issue for trial"' and summary judgment
must be granted. 99
These principles are based upon the need to separate cases
that warrant a trial from those that do not. They are consistent
with the function performed by the extradition magistrate, and
should be imported into the law of extradition-with the proviso
that the government in an extradition case need only establish
probable cause, not a prima facie case.200 Thus, as a general
198. 1& at 255.
199. Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
200. See, e.g., Sindona v. Grant, 461 F. Supp. 199, 205, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (re-
questing government does not have to prove prima facie case, but need only establish
probable cause); Lindstrom v. Gilkey, No. 98 C 5191, 1999 WL 342320, at *9 (N.D. Ill.
May 14, 1999) ("competent evidence to establish reasonable grounds [to extradite] is
not necessarily evidence competent to convict.") (quoting Fernandez v. Phillips, 268
U.S. 311, 312 (1925)); RESTATE MENT, supra note 162, § 476 comment b (stating that
while U.S. law and treaties require showing of probable cause, "[i] n Great Britain and
states following the British model, the standard is stricter, equivalent to a prima fade
case"); WHrrEmAN, supra note 14, at 975 (noting distinction between prima facie case
and probable cause in extradition context); HA KwORTH, supra note 87. But cf Charl-
ton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461, 33 S. Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274 (1913) ("[tlhe issue is
confined to the single question of whether the evidence for the state makes a prima
facie case of guilt sufficient to make it proper to hold the party for trial."); Collins v.
Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316, 42 S. Ct. 469, 66 L. Ed. 956 (1922) (referring to accused's
right to explain "ambiguities or doubtful elements in the prima facie case"); In re Sha-
piro, 352 F. Supp. 641, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("the testimony of the complaining wit-
nesses leaves no doubt that prima facie the offenses asserted in the Statement of Charge
have been made out and call for a trial of the merits."); In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70, 73
(E.D.N.Y. 1915) ("the evidence presented, as found by the judge upon the hearing,
makes out a prima facie case"); BAssiounm, supra note 32, at 713 ("the probable cause
standard is akin to a prima facie standard."). If the evidentiary showing needed to
establish probable cause is less demanding than that needed to make out a prima facie
case, then it is theoretically possible that the accused might have documentary evidence
sufficient to defeat the requesting government's prima facie case but not the govern-
ment's showing of probable cause. However, if the accused's documentary evidence is
of such probative force that it would have entitled the accused to summary judgment in
the analogous civil context, as a practical matter, it is difficult to imagine how there
would still be probable cause in the face of such evidence. Nevertheless, to allow for
the theoretical possibility, an extradition magistrate presented by the accused with evi-
dence sufficient to grant summary judgment should admit the evidence, and should
nevertheless decide whether, notwithstanding the strength of the accused's evidence,
there is still probable cause to believe the accused committed the crimes charged, tak-
ing into account the conceptual distinction (assuming there is one) between a showing
of probable cause and establishing a prima facie case.
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matter, U.S. extradition magistrates should continue to exclude
contrary factual accounts, recantations, alibi evidence, proof of
prior inconsistent statements by the prosecution's witnesses, and
similar evidence that, ordinarily, simply gives rise to an issue of
fact to be determined at trial. Extradition magistrates should,
however, admit unimpeachable evidence, such as a document or
photograph, of a caliber sufficient to grant summary judg-
ment.20'
Under the proposed approach, the extradition magistrate
should determine first whether the government's evidence
standing alone suffices to establish probable cause. As in the
summary judgment context, the government at the extradition
hearing is entitled to the benefit of reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from the evidence.20 2 If the government's evi-
dence standing alone does not establish probable cause, then
the government has not met its burden, and the extradition
magistrate must refuse to certify the accused for extradition.
If the government's evidence, standing alone, suffices to es-
tablish probable cause, then the extradition magistrate should
next consider whether the government's evidence, taken to-
gether with the explanatory and contradictory evidence prof-
fered by the accused, "could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for" the government.2 "3 Proceeding from the premise that
a trial on the merits should only occur in the requesting coun-
try,20 4 if the overall effect of the evidence is such that a rational
trier of fact could find for the government, the extradition mag-
201. For example, if the accused can prove conclusively that he was incarcerated at
the time he is alleged to have robbed a bank, such proof should be admissible and
dispositive even though it contradicts the requesting government's proof and consti-
tutes an alibi defense. On the other hand, if the accused has witnesses willing to swear
that he was with them on the date in question, that merely creates an issue of fact to be
resolved at trial.
202. See, e.g., Shapiro, 352 F. Supp. at 645 (finding probable cause by drawing "the
permissible inference" from evidence "even if no single direct act had been brought
home by any witness to" accused); Eain v. Adams, 529 F. Supp. 685, 692 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(finding probable cause based upon "all evidence received, and all reasonable infer-
ences to be drawn therefrom"), affid sub nom. Ealn v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 688 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (making probable cause determination, relying upon "inferences which are logi-
cally drawn from the circumstances presented in the evidence."), affid, 619 F.2d 167
(2d Cir. 1980).
203. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
204. See supra notes 18-19, 25, 40, 55, 60, 69 and accompanying text.
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istrate should disallow the proffered evidence and should certify
the accused for extradition. On the other hand, if the overall
effect of the evidence is such that no rational trier of fact could
find for the government, the accused's evidence should be ad-
mitted, and the facts established by the accused's documentary
or other unimpeachable evidence should be found in favor of
the accused.
Courts should generally continue to admit non-contradic-
tory defense evidence that explains the government's proof, irre-
spective of the strength of that evidence, 20 5 subject to the limita-
tion established by Sindona that the evidence be of "limited
scope '20 6 and "reasonably clear-cut"207 so as to avoid a trial on
the merits. It is important to note that this proposal does not
envision the emergence of a substantial new body of case law in
which extradition is denied. Cases in which the accused has evi-
dence sufficient to defeat extradition under the standard pro-
posed in this Article are likely to be few and far between. Before
an extradition request reaches the courts, it is screened by both
the Department of State and the Department of Justice.
2°8
There is no reason to believe that the U.S. Government wishes to
devote prosecutorial resources to pursuing extradition requests
that can be overcome by incontrovertible proof. Nor is there
any indication in the reported case law that such extradition re-
quests have reached the courts.
While this Article proposes a refinement to the Rule of Non-
Contradiction, the Rule itself should not be jettisoned.
Although the Rule originated in an era that pre-dated routine
intercontinental air travel, 209 it is still the case today that there
would be serious hardship to the requesting government and its
205. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
206. Sindona, 450 F. Supp. at 685.
207. Id
208. See RESrATEMENT, supra note 162, § 478 comment a; Title 9, United States
Attorney's Manual, § 9-15.700 (1999) (stating that Office of International Affairs of U.S.
Department of Justice "reviews [extradition] requests for sufficiency and forwards ap-
propriate ones to the district" for initiation of extradition proceedings).
209. See Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461, 33 S. Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274 (1913);
Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 315-16 (1922); In re Wadge, 15 F. 864, 866 (S.D.N.Y.
1883); In re Orteiza y Cortes, 136 U.S. 330, 337 (1890). See also Bingham v. Bradley, 241
U.S. 511, 517 (1916) (requiring "the demanding government to send its citizens to
another country to institute legal proceedings, would defeat the whole object of the
treaty."); In re Farez, 8 F. Cas. 1007, 1012 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870) ("Such a result would
entirely destroy the object of such treaties.").
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witnesses were it required to engage in a full-scale trial on the
merits in the requested country.210 As a practical matter, aban-
doning the Rule of Non-Contradiction would likely compel the
requesting government to present live witnesses at the extradi-
tion hearing in order to enable the extradition magistrate to
make a credibility determination.2 1  In addition to the enor-
mous imposition on civilian witnesses, in many cases, the re-
questing government's witnesses include convicted felons. The
need to remove them temporarily from the requesting country's
jails and transport them on a civilian passenger aircraft to the
United States in order to testify at an extradition hearing would
provide a serious disincentive to the requesting country to pur-
sue its extradition requests, thereby undermining the entire sys-
tem of bilateral extradition treaties. It also goes without saying
that the United States would prefer neither to send its felon-wit-
nesses to foreign countries, nor permit the entry of foreign con-
victs into this country, even under tight security, in order to tes-
tify at extradition hearings.
The Rule of Non-Contradiction, however, should not be
viewed by foreign governments as a license to commit perjury.
U.S. extradition magistrates should not allow the Rule of Non-
Contradiction to be exploited by foreign investigators and wit-
nesses to misrepresent facts without fear of contradiction. Noth-
ing in the law of extradition-including the need to avoid a full-
scale trial on the merits-mandates that a U.S. extradition mag-
istrate close his or her eyes to outright misrepresentation.
210. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 902 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that
even "in the era of the jet airplane ... the transportation of witnesses thousands of
miles has elements of trouble and expense"); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 362 F. Supp. 1057,
1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("It would be most difficult for a court in one jurisdiction to seek
to determine factual issues arising in another distant jurisdiction. Undoubtedly, this
constitutes the rationale for requiring that the demanding country to support extradi-
tion merely prove reasonable grounds to believe the fugitive guilty.").
211. See, e.g., In re Singh, 124 F.R.D. 571, 577 (D.NJ. 1987) ("[Tlhe Government
would be compelled to produce witnesses here. That is simply too close to the dress
rehearsal trial the Court must avoid."); In re Shapiro, 352 F. Supp. 641, 647 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) ("[i]t would introduce chaos into extradition proceedings to construe the treaty
so as to require the personal appearance of the complaining witnesses in the state of
asylum."); Wadger 15 F. at 866 (allowing accused to introduce alibi evidence "might
compel the demanding government to produce all its evidence here, both direct and
rebutting, in order to meet the defense thus gathered from every quarter."), Orteiza, 136
U.S. at 337 (quoting Wadge); Letter dated Apr. 20, 1961, from Secretary of State Dean
Rusk to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, reprinted in WBTssA, supra note 14, at
999-1000.
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Where documents, photographs, or similar unimpeachable evi-
dence offered by the accused contradicts the requesting govern-
ment's evidence, the extradition magistrate should look at that
evidence and decide whether a reasonable fact finder could still
find for the government. If not, then the court should admit the
evidence and should refuse to certify the accused for extradition.
CONCLUSION
The Rule of Non-Contradiction arises out of the need to
prevent extradition hearings from becoming trials on the merits.
Yet, the Rule has the harsh effect of precluding probative, and
perhaps dispositive, evidence offered by an accused. Some
courts, while purporting to endorse the Rule, have found ways to
sidestep it. These decisions are incompatible with U.S. treaty ob-
ligations. While the Rule itself should remain in effect, courts
should permit the accused to offer documentary, photographic,
or other evidence that leaves no genuine issue of fact for trial.
Admitting such evidence would not require the U.S. courts to try
extradition cases on the merits, and would enhance the due pro-
cess function served by the extradition hearing.
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